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In the firs 
"..C:,...- 
t chapter we opened our considerations with a discussion of the 
~LULXULAJ ,,customH and ,,customary standard". We traced the factual 
element - the behaviour - and the intellectual element - the convic- 
tion that this behaviour conforms with the legal norm - in the decisions 
of the courts and concluded that a custom can only be relevant in law if, 
during a more or less considerable time, the vast majority of the group 
concerned acts in conformity with the custom. In this respect there ap- 
peared to be an analogy between a custom and a customary standard. 
Chapter 11. 
In the second chapter we considered articles 3 and 5 A.B., as well as arti- 
cles 1375 and 1383 B.W. (Articles 1135 and 1160 C.C.), so important in 
the law of contracts. As to article 3 A.B. it appeared that the courts, a t  
all events as far as civil law is concerned, adhere most strictly to (the 
words of) this article and enforce customs only if the law refers to them. 
We argued nevertheless that article 3 A.B. does not forbid taking a cus- 
tom into account in establishing the meaning of the so-called ,,vague 
standards". We illustrated our point of view with a number of decisions 
on the subject of the law of tort. As far as article 5 A.B. is concerned we 
found that the courts in most cases deny legal validity to the law-abolish- 
ing custom. 
Having shown that articles 1375 and 1383 B.W. have been derived - via 
the French Civil Code - from pronouncements of DOMAT (1625-1695) and 
POTHIER (1699-1772), we discussed the several questions to which these 
articles have given rise. In the first place we demonstrated that both the 
custom of article 1375 B.W. and the customary standard of article 1383 
B.W. may be general aswell as local, and that both moreover may be restric - 
ted to a certain trade or profe-ion. Then again we argued that the custo- 
mary standard bears not only on written stipulations but also on oral ones. 
Furthermore we learned that the ,,nature of the agreement", mentioned in 
article 1375 B.W., is decisive for the applicability of the custom, in the 
sense that in any given case it must be ascertained whether the agreement 
under discussion comes under the type of agreements in which the custom 
figures. Notwithstanding the fact that article 1383 B.W. does not mention 
the ,,nature of the agreement", we held the ..nature of tbe 
decisive for the applicability of the cnstomary standard too. 
Lastly we reviewed the relation between custom and equity. There re 
took the view, that a custom may be checked with equity only in a con- 
crete case and that a custom should give way to equity if  the application 
of the former leads to a clearly inequitable result. However we made the 
reservation that equity must not prevail at the cost of legal security, if 
non-enforcement of the custom WC to serious legal insecurity and 
confusion among the parties concer 
I Chapter 111. 
In the third chapter we reviewed the meaning of articles 1375 and 1383 
B.W. We argued that, in view of the text of article 1375 B.W. and its 
position in the Code, it is reasonable to suppose, that the legislator did not 
conceive of article 1375 B.W. as a rule of interpretation. However, com- 
plete certainty as to that cannot be obtained, because the interpretation 
article 1382 B.W. (Article 1159 C.C.) leads us to suppose, that custom has 
been intended as an instrument for determining the intentions of the 
contracting parties, at least if one assumes that the legislator did under- 
stand the pronouncement of POTHIER, from which article 1382 B.W. has 
been derived, in the right way. As to article 1383 B.W., we came to the 
conclusion that both its genesis and its text and place in the Code make it 
plausible that the legislator has meant this article as a rule of interpreta- 
tion, basing the customary standard on the tacit intention of the con- 
tracting parties. 
Having compared the custom of article 1375 B.W. with customs originated 
outside the domain of the law of contracts, as well as with customs which 
arise only after the conclusion of the agreement, during the execution 
thereof, with customs therefore that cannot possibly be construed as 
based on the intention of the contracting parties, we came to the conclu- 
sion that the custom of article 1375 B.W. must be considered as an auto- 
nomous source of law. We argued moreover that, in general, contracting 
parties do not have the custom of article 1375 in mind when contracti,ng 
with each other, so that they can hardly have had an intention as to that. 
Therefore we defined the custom of article 1375 B.W. as a rule of law, 
applicable within a certain circle in virtue of the sole fact of making the 
contract without the intentions of the contracting parties playing any 
part therein. 
We argued further that there is no valid reason to make a fundamental 
distinction, with respect to the basis of validity, between custom and 
customary standard, so that the customary standard too must be under- 
stood as a rule of law, applicable within a certain circle in virtue of the 
sole fact of making the contract. Both custom and customary standard 
therefore fulfil, with respect to the consequences of the contract not 
settled by the contracting parties, the same function as provisions of the 
law. This conclusion implies that article 1382 B.W. should be considered 
as non-existent. 
We demonstrated our point of view with respect to article 1383 B.W. on 
the arbitration clause which has developed into a customary standard. 
Contrary to the current doctri'ne and case-law, which hold such clause 
applicable, because it  is considered to be based on the tacit intention of 
the contracting parties and thus to comply with article 170 Grw. (Con- 
stitutional Law), we argued that such a clause can only be enforced if i t  
appears that its application was in fact intended by the contracting 
parties a t  the time of contract. The fact that an arbitration clause has 
developec :ustornary standard is therefore in OUI "-4. 
itself suff und to  make i t  enforceable. 




In the fourth chapter we rendered exhaustively the case-law concerning 
the point whether a custom contra legem has any legal validity. I t  appear- 
ed that the decisions, particularly those of the Supreme Court, are more 
or less contradictory. The same discord appeared also in the literature. 
Having rejected the opinions of HOUWING, VAN OPSTALL and SCHOLTEN, 
we argued that one must determine in each particular case what results 
equity and reasonableness demand as to  the conflict between law and 
custom or customary standard. For instance: custom or customary stan- 
dard should prevail against the law, if the vast majority of the parties 
concerned complies with such custom or standard and counts on its com- 
pliance. For i t  would be inequitable and unreasonable to let the law pre- 
vail in such a case. We made an exception nevertheless for the eventuality 
that enforcement of the custom or customary standard would tend to 
lead to  a clearly inequitable and unreasonable result. In such a case the 
law or a rule of equity - to be formulated by the court - should be pre- 
fered, unless - we added - non enforcement of the custom or custo- 
ious legal 
l case i t  w 
1 and con 
etter to  e 
mary standard would bring about ser insecuriQ fusion 
among the parties concerned, in whick rould be b nforce 
the custom or customary standard. 
In  our submission it makes no difference in principle whether the contrary 
provision of the law be directory or imperative. We stipulated neverthe- 
less that in case of confict with a provision of imperative law, much higher 
demands must be made upon the strength and firmness of the custom or 
customary standard than in case of conflict with a provision of directory 
law. We restricted ver to  tha egem, 
which only limit tl: ~lation; W lity to  
law-abolishing custl 5 A.B. for1 bolish 
a law. 
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In the fifi 
evidence is concernea, custom ana customary stanaara snoula De con- 
sidered as a rule of law which the court should enforce ex officio or as a 
fact which must be alleged by the litigants and in case of dispute must be 
proved unless i t  should happen to  be common knowledge. Contrary to the 
current doctrine and case-law we upheld the latter conception. In our 
opinion i t  was thereby of paramount importance that both with custom 
and with the customary standard emphasis falls on the factual element. 
Chapter VI. 
The sixth and final chapter we devoted to  ius constituendum. There was 
the more reason for this, now that in connection with the complete revision 
of the Civil Code a bill has been already drafted - the bill for drawing up 
an introductory section of the new Civil Code - in which MEYER~ has., ; 
formulated his ideas on the customary law. We developed objections 
against several dispositions of this draft bill. 
In  the first place we held the proposed provision that a custom may not 
prevail against a provision of imperative law to be undesirable because 
such a provision would do more harm than good. A provision in contrary 
sense would be just as undesirable because it would perhaps lead to  the 
custom too easily prevailing against the imperative law. Having regard to 
the impossibility of arriving a t  an acceptable wording on this point, we 
therefore prefered that the law remain silent. 
The proposed provision that a custom prevails against a provision of 
d l r e c t o ~  law we held to be too absolute and too formalistically worded. 
We therefore advocated a provision which opens up the possibility that a 
custom prevails against the directory law. This would ensure that the , , 
decision as to the prevailing force would be, in e-nd every case a-new, a . 
up to  the courts. In connection with the desirability of such a provision 
we advocated mentioning explicitly not only the custom, but also t k  
customary standard, which is to be distinguished from, but identical i 
function with, the custom, thereby making i t  clear that the customax 
standard is not based on the tacit intention of the contracting partie 
The same objections which we advanced to the aforementioned propose 
provision referring to the relation between custom and provisions ( 
directory law we developed also against the proposed provision referrir 
to  the relation between custom and equity; in this respect too, we woul 
prefer a provision stating that a custom may be left unenforced if it 
---- 
would in actual fact lead to an inequiGKer6sult.- - 
E f l y e m r E S s m h e O p ~ W h a t  iuthe mew Civil Code i t  would 
no longer be necessarv for the individual articles to  refer to a custom, 
- ' point bein [to account in the introductory chapter of the Code. 
Iq br. 
